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Small states are often argued to be negligible in the big picture of 
international relations with little agency to pursue their interests.  
However, this view has recently been challenged by the actions of a 
number of particularly active small states taking advantage of new 
avenues of influence which are more suited to their diminutive size.  Yet 
this does not explain why some small states have pursued a highly 
active foreign policy while others have continued to stay on the 
sidelines.  This paper argues that a high degree of internal stability and 
external ambiguity is linked to a small state with a high level of foreign 
policy initiative.  This theory is supported through an OLS regression 
analysis utilizing new meta-data to measure external activism.  A 
comparative exploration of a highly active Qatar and a more timid 
Kuwait demonstrates how small states with similar characteristics can 
display varying levels of foreign policy initiative.   
Introduction 
 
In the Westphalian system states come in a variety of sizes.  In international 
relations these sizes matter a great deal.  From military capabilities to economic clout, 
size is a significant and ubiquitous aspect in understanding the behavior of states.  Small 
states are often seen as negligible in the larger context of great power politics.  Yet in 
recent years there have been a number of small states taking on an increasingly active 
role on the global stage.  Changes in the international system have given these bantam 
states new avenues to try to influence others and take on a foreign policy profile above 
their diminutive stature.  Present day Lilliputians have a choice to pursue a foreign 
policy beyond what previous literature would limit them to.  However, there is 
substantial variation among small states in the extent to which they have pursued an 
outsized foreign policy.  Why have some small states demonstrated a higher level of 
foreign policy initiative than others?  I argue that confidence in internal stability 
alongside a perception of external ambiguity leads a small state to pursue a high level of 
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foreign policy initiative.  A stable domestic political environment and a lack of external 
certainty or direction are drivers of a small state taking an active role beyond its borders.   
States with global or regional hegemonic capabilities possess the incentive to 
develop a high level of foreign policy initiative in order to further their interests and 
security in an attempt to increase their power.  The size of these state’s influence in the 
international realm along with the benefits of shaping international institutions and 
structure once in charge make their activity in international relations a part of their 
political culture.  For a small state these benefits are likely outside the realm of 
possibilities as they increase their level of foreign policy initiative.  For this reason it is 
important to look at small states differently than middle or large powers when talking 
about the development of foreign policy preferences. 
 Small states make up the vast majority of the international system.  Of the 191 UN 
member-states it is estimated that no more than two dozen would assuredly fall outside 
this category1.  Despite this numerical superiority the study of small states foreign policy 
is often overlooked.  It is important to understand the place of small states in terms of 
international relations.  A vital aspect of this in the 21st century is providing answers to 
explain the variation in these small state’s foreign policies.  To start this paper will first 
give an overview of the previous academic literature on small state foreign policy.  The 
next chapter will present the theoretical argument of this thesis in explaining the 
variation in small state foreign policy.  This theory will then be tested quantitatively 
through a multiple regression analysis.  Lastly, an in-depth investigation of relevant case 
                                                        
1 Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstohl, “Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?,” in Small States 
in International Relations, ed. Christine Ingebritsen et al. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2006), 3. 
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studies will exhibit how small state foreign policy is shaped and expressed as well as 
illustrating both the validity and difficulty in applying my theory to real-world 
circumstances.  This paper will explore a dichotomous case study, Qatar/Kuwait.
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Literature Review 
 
What Makes a State “Small?” 
 
 The first attempt to categorize states according to size was the Treaty of 
Chaumont in 18171.  The wave of newly independent states during the 1960’s gave rise to 
a debate on how to define a small state2.  The most commonly applied criteria are an 
objective classification based on population, geographic area and economic capacity3.  
For instance Clarke & Payne defines a small state as one with a population under 1 
million people4, while East partitions small states as those with a population under 23.7 
million people5.  Moving beyond only a population classification, Crowards utilizes a 
cluster analysis taking into account the population, area and wealth of 190 states in 
order to create 5-tier classification system of state size6. These definitions allow for a 
coherent classification for possible testing, but are hampered by their arbitrary nature 
and inability to include possible economic or geographic outliers.   
 A more subjective classification is also commonly utilized.  Small states are often 
defined by their position within the international system.  Vital argues that a small state 
is ‘small’ in relation to a greater power it is interacting with7.  According to Keohane, 
small states are those that are “system ineffectual,” that is they are unable to influence 
                                                        
1 Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 12–3. 
2 Nazrin Mehdiyeva, Power Game in the Caucasus (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 16. 
3 Tom Crowards, “Defining the Category of ‘Small’ States,” Journal of International Development 14, no. 
2 (March 2002): 143. 
4 Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, eds., Politics, Security, and Development in Small States (Winchester, 
MA: Allen & Unwin Inc., 1987), XVII. 
5 Maurice A. East, “Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models.,” World Politics, 25, no. 4 
(July 1, 1973): 563. 
6 Crowards, “Defining the Category of ‘Small’ States.” 
7 David Vital, The Survival of Small States (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
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the international system8 .  Rothstein defines small states not as “great powers writ 
small,” but as states that see themselves as weak within the international system and 
require the security of outside help9.  This definition however includes many large or 
medium sized states that do not have complete military self-reliance.  Hey also looks to 
perception, both from within and outside the state, in order to define small10.  Maass 
identifies a division between definitions based on ‘hard’ quantitative data and those 
utilizing a more subjective qualitative approach.  He however argues that the lack of 
consensus on a definition is in fact beneficial to the field by allowing flexibility in order 
to match different research designs, “the study of small states allows for – it may even 
call for – a variety of different conceptualizations”11.   
Small States Confined by the Cold War 
 
 The initial research focusing on small states in international relations came out of 
the rise of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War.  It thought of small states in 
terms of the realist perspective at an international systemic level, or what Waltz terms 
the Third Image12.  David Vital was one of the first to concentrate on small states.  His 
book focuses on small states in conflict with larger powers within a hierarchical 
international system.  He utilizes three case studies to demonstrate how small states are 
disadvantaged in their interactions with larger states due to their inability to utilize 
force.  Because of their lack of capability to defend themselves within the international 
                                                        
8 R O Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International 
Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 291–310. 
9 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 1–30. 
10 Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Introducting Small State Foreign Policy,” in Small States in World Politics: 
Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey (Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner, 2003), 3. 
11 Matthias Maass, “The Elusive Definition of the Small State,” International Politics 46, no. 1 (2009): 81. 
12 Kenneth N Waltz, Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959). 
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system it is argued that small states are first and foremost concerned about their 
security and are therefore forced to react to their external environment much more than 
domestic conditions13.  Vital tries to show that in conflict between a power and a tertiary 
state the end result depends on the role the small state plays in the goals of the great 
power14.  However, Vital does make a distinction between the intrinsic and the 
contingent capabilities of small states15.  The significance of a minor power is 
determined by its contingent role within the international system despite its lack of 
intrinsic capability, either politically or militarily. 
 Rothstein and Keohane both look at small states as subservient to their external 
environments and primarily concerned with their insecurity in the same manner of 
Vital.  Rothstein argues that small states are much more likely to utilize international 
organizations in order to more effectively pursue their foreign policy aims16.  
International organizations are likely to treat states equally and provide security to its 
membership, thereby creating a more equalized playing field for the small state17.  
Keohane furthers the discussion by arguing that at least some of a small state’s behavior 
can be explained by the ideas that the state holds about itself and its position within the 
international system18.  This is the first instance of an argument for domestic factors 
having an influence in shaping small state foreign policy 
East produces the first quantitative analysis of small state foreign policy patterns.  
Utilizing the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations dataset, East explores the 
                                                        
13 Vital, The Survival of Small States, 124. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 9. 
16 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers. 
17 Ibid., 42. 
18 Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics.” 
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similarities and differences in foreign policy between large and small states during the 
1959-68 period.  He finds that even when controlling for level of development, small 
states are less active within the international system than their larger counterparts19.  He 
also shows that small states have a higher percentage of events initiated while 
partnering with other states, as well as events targeted at an entire international 
organization20, supporting Rothstein’s argument.  East also found that small states are 
more likely to engage in nonverbal behavior, indicating a greater inclination to actual 
foreign policy ‘actions’ instead of ‘words.’  In a separate article East explains his previous 
findings by focusing on the ineffectiveness of the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
influence policy in a small developing state21.  In general, early literature concerning the 
foreign policy behavior of small states focused on their inherent ‘weakness’ within the 
international system and the manner in which they can confront the dependence which 
derives from it. 
New Levels of Analysis 
 
 After the end of the Cold War a new wave of small state foreign policy literature 
emerged outside of a Third Image analysis.  Miriam Elman challenges the assumption 
that the foreign policy of small states can be accounted for by external structural or 
systemic factors22.  Utilizing 19th century US foreign policy as a case study she argues 
that domestic rules and structures have more effect on military strategy than external 
factors.   In general, Elman argues that both domestic and external levels of analysis are 
                                                        
19 East, “Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models.,” 563. 
20 Ibid., 565–6. 
21 Maurice A. East, “Foreign Policy-Making in Small States: Some Theoretic Observations Based on a 
Study of the Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” Policy Sciences 4, no. 4 (1973): 491–508. 
22 Miriam Fendius Elman, “The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own 
Backyard.,” British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 2 (April 1995): 171. 
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important because “while international environment influences domestic political 
choices, these institutional decisions shape foreign policies in later periods”23.  Doeser 
argues that changes in the domestic political situation can impact foreign policy change 
in small states24.  Looking at the change in Danish policy towards NATO during the late-
80s the author contends that the changes in political party opposition as well as public 
opposition brought about a reversal of long-standing foreign policy, regardless of the 
external environment. 
Hey takes the analysis a step further by investigating Luxembourgish foreign 
policy in the 1990’s at a systemic, domestic and individual level25.  The article finds that 
Luxembourg uses its lack of size as an advantage.  At the systemic level, Luxembourg 
can be highly active within the European Union without posing a threat to other states.  
At the domestic level its small population allows for the development of a national 
consensus on foreign policy goals among both the elite and public.  At the individual 
level there are few if any drawbacks or advantages to size, but it is pointed out that their 
skilled and well-respected Prime Minister is beneficial to their foreign policy 
ambitions26.  However, even when accounting for all three levels of analysis, Hey still 
finds that Luxembourg’s wealth is its most important factor in explaining its active role.   
According to Gvalia et al. elite ideas are more important than structural or 
material factors in explaining small state foreign policy.  The article looks towards 
constructivism to explain small state foreign policy behavior.  The authors focus on elite 
                                                        
23 Ibid., 217. 
24 Fredrik Doeser, “Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: The Fall of the Danish 
‘footnote Policy’.,” Cooperation & Conflict 46, no. 2 (June 2011): 222–41. 
25 Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Luxembourg’s Foreign Policy: Does Small Size Help or Hinder?,” Innovation: The 
European Journal of Social Sciences 15, no. 3 (September 2002): 211–25. 
26 Ibid., 217–22. 
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ideas about the identity and purpose of the state27, in doing so they contend that the 
pattern of Georgia’s foreign policy can be explained by the western outlook of their 
elites.  Employing interviews with decision-makers within the Georgian government, the 
article finds that “Joining NATO and the EU are valued not only in terms of the security 
and prosperity they afford, but equally as an external affirmation of Georgia’s European 
identity”28.  While many realists may argue that Georgia should be bandwagoning with 
Russia, the small Caucasus state has instead continued to position itself closer to the 
West despite changes in the external environment (e.g. 2008 Russia-Georgia War).  This 
assertion of identity over structure runs contrary to much of the early literature on small 
state foreign policy.  In explaining small state foreign policy-making it is important to 
take into account multiple levels of influence.   
Small State Foreign Policy in the 21st Century 
 
 For many scholars it became apparent that in the post-Cold War era small states 
have shown themselves to participate in the international system in ways unaccounted 
for in previous literature.  The explanations for why and how these changes have 
occurred vary.  Cooper & Momani argue that the 21st century presents a far greater range 
of choices and outcomes for small states, both in terms of failure and success29.  
Interdependence creates a greater opportunity for a small state to become a failed state, 
but at the same time presents opportunities for it to be upwardly mobile in international 
relations.  The authors argue that the literature on small states cannot accurately explain 
                                                        
27 Giorgi Gvalia et al., “Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States.,” 
Security Studies 22, no. 1 (February 2013): 100. 
28 Ibid., 116. 
29 Andrew F. Cooper and Bessma Momani, “Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy.,” 
International Spectator 46, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 115. 
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the unique diplomatic role of Qatar.  The article argues that for small states’ foreign 
policy to “punch above their weight” they must be resilient economically and politically.  
This resilience is adaptive and pragmatic policymaking in order to overcome the 
vulnerability of their size, while taking advantage of the opportunities that 
interdependence presents30.  Qatar is the exemplifier of this resilience by upgrading its 
diplomatic reputation through a variety of ways over many different areas and crises. 
 Mehdiyeva also argues that the 21st century presents new opportunities by 
introducing the strategy of strategic maneuvering to explain the post-Cold War foreign 
policy of Azerbaijan.  This strategic maneuvering “has the enhancement of sovereignty 
and autonomy over its domestic and foreign policy as the main goal”31.  It is different 
from neutralism in that it pursues areas of mutual interest through pro-active 
engagement with a variety of large states, thereby maintaining a high international 
position32.  With its abundant energy reserves Azerbaijan is able to have a high level of 
interaction with great powers without falling under any one sphere of influence.  “In 
essence, strategic maneuvering envisages a partial accommodation of great-power 
interests without a formal alliance with any of them”33.  Chong believes that symbolic, or 
soft power, is especially efficient for small states to enlarge their importance to the 
international community.  The article cites Singapore and the Vatican City as two small 
states that have utilized their soft power in political economy potential, models of good 
governance and diplomatic mediation34.  As he claims, these two states “manifest these 
                                                        
30 Ibid., 117. 
31 Mehdiyeva, Power Game in the Caucasus, 26. 
32 Ibid., 27. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Alan Chong, “Small State Soft Power Strategies: Vitrual Enlargement in the Cases of the Vatican City 
State and Singapore,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23, no. 3 (September 2010): 383. 
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characteristics of small state soft power by converting their bases of anomalous power 
into instruments for virtual enlargement”35.   
 Both Browning and Aaltola discuss the importance of identity in shaping small 
state foreign policy.  Adopting a constructivist perspective, both argue that Finland has 
utilized its diminutive stature as an important part of their identity and the resulting 
foreign policy.  Browning rejects that ‘smallness’ inherently results in weakness and that 
it can in fact be seen in a more positive light36.  Smallness is formulated differently in 
different national identity narratives.  In Finland’s case this “has been narrated at 
different times as both a restriction and an opportunity and facilitating condition,” while 
in recent years the Finnish identity has put a greater emphasis on innovation and 
smartness over size37.  Aaltola furthers the identity argument by postulating that the 
tradition of Finnish foreign policy flexibility which developed during the Cold War has 
given Finland greater agency in international politics because “small state agency may 
be based on flexibility, agility, and innovativeness”38.   
 Braveboy-Wagner attempts to redeem the place of realism within the study of 
small state foreign policy by employing a perspective of power and anarchy to 
understand the use of soft power by small states, explaining the foreign policy behavior 
of Trinidad & Tobago.39  Braveboy-Wagner argues that small states will generally focus 
on smaller foreign policy circles; for Trinidad & Tobago this is their regional neighbors 
                                                        
3535 Ibid., 386. 
36 Christopher S Browning, “Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature,” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2006): 669–84. 
37 Ibid., 682. 
38 Mika Aaltola, “Agile Small State Agency: Heuristic Plays and Flexible National Identity Markers in 
Finnish Foreign Policy,” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 39, no. 2 (2011): 
258. 
39 Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, “Opportunities and Limitations of the Exercise of Foreign Policy Power 
by a Very Small State: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23, 
no. 3 (September 2010): 407–25. 
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as well as a strong bilateral relationship with the US.  For Braveboy-Wagner “even very 
small states can exercise power within limited domains as long as they possess certain 
capabilities….and are ready to seize available opportunities”40.  For Trinidad & Tobago 
these capabilities are their vast energy reserves, making them a relative economic 
hegemon within the Caribbean Basin (i.e. CARICOM).  Any power that Trinidad & 
Tobago exerts is, according to Braveboy-Wagner, based on its possession of large 
natural gas reserves41.  This argument is analogous to that made by Hey concerning 
Luxembourgish foreign policy being directly connected to its wealth.  With appropriate 
resources and values a small state can craft a proactive and influential foreign policy in 
targeted areas.  In general, Braveboy-Wagner takes a more judicious stance on small 
state capabilities in the 21st century by setting limits to their foreign policy realms. 
 In an overview of recent literature concerning small state foreign policy there is a 
discernible pattern of small states pursuing policies in international relations which are 
beyond what would be expected of them during the Cold War.  Since that time small 
states have demonstrated an ability to act as a bigger player then their size should 
warrant.  However, the explanation for why these states are both able and willing to 
pursue an outsized foreign policy has still not been established, or explored on a broad 
scale.  This academic investigation will attempt to provide possible answers to this 
mystery.  
 
                                                        
40 Ibid., 407. 
41 Ibid., 412. 
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Determinants of Small State Foreign Policy 
 
More Room for Small States 
 
 The international system in the 21st century has up to this point been 
characterized by greater economic interdependence1, a high level of transnationalism 
and a devolved unipolarity2.   In this environment, small states possess a greater range 
of both foreign policy choices and outcomes3; their room for maneuvering has 
expanded.  The new rules of the post-Cold War order have given small states more 
avenues to participate on the international stage in new ways.  As Cooper & Momani 
note, during the 1990’s many small states “were able to take advantage of the removal of 
barriers to international trade and investment through a variety of means”4.  
Simultaneously, the increase in energy and commodity prices that began near the start 
of the 21st century allowed small resource-rich states to vastly increase their wealth 
while at the same time providing them with an asymmetrical advantage in foreign 
policy5.  
As large and lumbering universalist IGOs (usually dominated by great powers) 
falter in the devolved 21st century, new regional, ad-hoc or issue-specific groupings and 
organizations are taking a greater role in global governance6.  Small states can have a 
                                                        
1 Robert O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (New York: Routledge, 
2002). 
2 Amitai Etzioni, “The Devolution of American Power,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 37, no. 1 
(2013): 13–34. 
3 Cooper and Momani, “Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy.,” 115. 
4 Ibid., 116. 
5 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the 
Wake of the Arab Spring, HH Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammad Al-Sabeh Publication Series (Durham 
University, October 2012), https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/alsabah/SmallStateswithaBigRole.pdf. 
6 Stewart Patrick, “The Unruled World,” Foreign Affairs, 2014. 
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greater say in these newly salient actors.  New Zealand has more influence in the free 
trade negotiations of the regional Trans-Pacific Partnership than in the Doha Rounds, 
while Qatar and the UAE can join an ad-hoc NATO led coalition intervening in Libya if 
they feel their interests align with the goals of the mission.  The escalation of complex 
interdependencies between states has broadened the range of tools to expand foreign 
policy beyond military capabilities7.  In this way this paper concurs with the liberal view 
that state power can vary across policy areas and that economic and cultural influences 
have become viable, and possibly more effective, foreign policy instruments8.  
Furthermore the perception of power has become more nuanced creating greater 
uncertainty in a state’s perception of their own power.  This uncertainty benefits small 
states by curbing great power’s confidence in their ability to dominate smaller neighbors 
and control the unintended consequences of their actions9.  
For a small state there are risks and benefits to pursuing an active foreign policy.  
It may bring the state political security and power, economic development and prestige 
while providing policy-makers with a higher level of approval.  But as Chong remarks 
“Vocal diplomatic roles can generate negative side-effects in other political, economic 
and military dimensions if not adroitly managed.”10  Or as Vital solemnly warns, 
mistakes by leaders of great powers can be disguised, but small state’s mistakes are “too 
often beyond repair”11.  A small state with an outsized degree of foreign policy initiative 
                                                        
7 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004). 
8 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 
2001). 
9 Toms Rostoks, “Small States, Power, International Change and Uncertainty,” in Small States in Europe, 
ed. Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 95–99. 
10 Chong, “Small State Soft Power Strategies: Vitrual Enlargement in the Cases of the Vatican City State 
and Singapore,” 384. 
11 Vital, The Survival of Small States, 12. 
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may find themselves isolated, weakened and, if not careful, threatened.  Leaders who are 
responsible for these policy errors are likely to see their support dwindle.   A high level 
of foreign policy initiative is not necessarily a smart decision for a state, but brings with 
it a large list of possible results.  
What Constitutes Foreign Policy Initiative? 
 
 This paper will attempt to capture differences in the activeness of small states in 
the global system of states.  This activity is termed in this paper as foreign policy 
initiative.  A high level of foreign policy initiative is described as a state actively 
attempting to further their interests and increase their influence on the international 
stage.  This term does not care about the end result of power or the effectiveness of such 
action, but instead on the attempt made by the state.  This attempt is characterized by a 
large amount of substantial and autonomous activity initiated by the state, or in 
conjunction with other states, in events occurring abroad.  A high degree of foreign 
policy initiative is also likely to be expressed as a greater degree of interaction in the 
international arena.  For although North Korea may be a loud and contrarian voice, its 
lack of meaningful interaction outside of its borders does not demonstrate a high level of 
initiative. 
Theory 
 
 Considering the uncertainty arising from a small state engaging in an active 
foreign policy it should be asked why they do so.  Certainly states will develop policy to 
pursue their interests, but interests are one of the few ubiquitous feature of all states 
and therefore unable to explain the variation in question.  Large and middle powers are 
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likely to see discernable outcomes from their foreign policy decision-making and have 
endogenous reasons for an active stance abroad.  
In looking globally at small states there are two prominent factors determining 
foreign policy initiative.  The first is the stability of the internal political environment.  A 
regime that is unable to effectively govern or feels threatened is not as likely to pursue 
an active foreign policy.  This domestic insecurity can derive from a variety of sources. 
At the lowest end of the spectrum is a “failed state” who has lost their de facto statehood 
of a monopoly on legitimate violence12.  On the other end would be an established 
democratic state whose leadership is facing an imminent political challenge from an 
opposition party, or is in a coalition or mixed government that is unable to form 
dynamic foreign policy preferences.  The second important factor is the volatility of a 
state’s external environment.  The more changeable a state views their position vis-à-vis 
their regional or international system the more likely they are to take on a high level of 
foreign policy initiative.  The most concrete iteration of this would be a belief that 
another state poses a serious threat to their survival.  This volatility is not always 
derived from a threat though, it can also be seen in the context of potential 
opportunities.  A declining hegemon will open up new avenues for a small state to 
increase its influence, while a regional IGO may give a small state a greater ability to 
shape policy versus a bilateral relationship.   
To be able to understand the preferences and behavior of states it is imperative to 
consider influences across levels of analysis.  This theory does just that by taking into 
account state and systemic levels of analysis.  It accepts Putnam’s premise that foreign 
                                                        
12 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the 
Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics 35, no. 1 (October 1982): 2. 
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policy is determined at two-levels simultaneously13.  Alons proposes a similar theory in 
answering what determines if states are more concerned with international or domestic 
constraints when shaping foreign policy14.  She argues that when internal polarity is high 
and external polarity is low a state is more likely to take international considerations 
into account, and vice-versa.  According to Alons internal polarity is “the degree of 
concentration of power in the hands of the government relative to society” and external 
polarity is “the degree of power concentration in the international system”15.  My theory 
diverges in that it is trying to answer a different question and that my definitions of 
stability encompass much more than her polarities.   
Internal Stability 
 
 Domestic factors are important in understanding foreign policy decisions and 
outcomes.  Taking into account state level constraints allows for a greater range of 
possible variables to consider when developing theory16.  Domestic political and 
institutional variation, it is argued, have a direct link in explaining international 
relations17.  The state-society relationship can shape national preferences and identity18, 
while even in authoritarian systems institutions can allow regime insiders to hold 
                                                        
13 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427–60. 
14 Gerry C. Alons, “Predicting a State’s Foreign Policy: State Preferences between Domestic and 
International Constraints,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3, no. 2 (2007): 211–32. 
15 Ibid., 212. 
16 Derek Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 62. 
17 James N. Rosenau, The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1967); Bruce 
Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Domestic Explanations of International Relations,” Annual 
Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 161–81. 
18 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513–53. 
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leaders accountable for foreign policy decisions to varying degrees19.  Internal factors 
cannot be overlooked in explaining foreign policy. 
 Domestic stability is crucial for a small state to develop a high level of foreign 
policy initiative.  It is assumed that any leader’s first priority is to stay in power, whether 
through re-election or quelling opposition.  Leaders who are overly constrained by their 
domestic weakness are unable to take on the risks and complexities of an active foreign 
policy despite the possible benefits.  Small states need to develop pragmatic and agile 
policy in order to try to take on a role beyond their size in the international system.  A 
stable domestic political environment is a cultivator of this dynamic external strategy.   
 Different regime types are likely to define domestic stability differently, especially 
when the instability comes from the elite level.  An established democracy with low 
stability is likely to exhibit leaders lacking a public mandate and a contentious 
environment characterized by brinkmanship and a lack of bipartisanship.  Instability for 
a fledgling democracy is likely to be a threat to the actual democratic institutions 
themselves.  A party-based authoritarian system with internal instability is likely to see 
inter-party competition for leadership.  A personalistic authoritarian regime would be 
worried about rivals, either in the family or in the junta, vying for a change in powers.  
In all cases widespread protests and unrest below the elite level are also a marker of low 
internal stability.  The same can be said for an actual internal threat to the state itself 
(e.g. ETA in Spain, Boko Haram in Nigeria).  My definition of internal stability differs 
from other ones like Alons which focus more on fixed institutional and societal inputs 
                                                        
19 Jessica L. Weeks, “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of 
International Conflict,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (May 2012): 326–47. 
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on government.   Mine deals more with the fluid dynamics of the political environment 
shaping foreign policy preference making. 
External Ambiguity 
 
States do not exist in a bubble fit neatly around their borders.  They are part of an 
international system which shapes the actions and characteristics of them.  In 
understanding foreign policy behavior the systemic level is crucial to place policy-
making in a fully-fledged context.  It has been argued often that small states in 
particular are susceptible to systemic pressures because of their vulnerability20.  As has 
already been described, it is changes at this level which have resulted in a new 
environment for small states to pursue a high level of foreign policy initiative.  Perhaps 
it is at this same level where variation will be able to be explained. 
Small states lack the material capacity to be an influential force around the world 
and across the totality of issue areas.    They instead must prudently react to the 
extraneous circumstances forced upon them.  By viewing small state diplomacy in this 
light, some external conditions would favor a large foreign policy initiative more than 
others.  If a state feels that the pressure and constraints of their external environment 
are not likely to change from the status quo they will be less likely to pursue extensive 
foreign policy.  Extending from that proposition, a small state that believes that its 
actions can create discernable benefits for itself will demonstrate a high level of foreign 
policy initiative.  A small state comfortable with the status quo will not. 
                                                        
20 Vital, The Survival of Small States, 8; Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Refining Our Understanding of Small State 
Foreign Policy,” in Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K. 
Hey (Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner, 2003), 186–93. 
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External environment is highly malleable to the perceptions of a state.  What 
constitutes the environment of a state is not fixed by geographic boundaries.  Because 
Chile perceives itself as a Pacific Rim nation it will pursue an active foreign policy in 
order to take advantage of the opportunities which come from interaction with Asia and 
North America, this includes membership in APEC and the Pacific Alliance21.  Ecuador 
also lies on the Pacific coast, but does not hold the same western outlook.  It instead 
looks closer to the more statist Latin America where fewer opportunities for change exist 
in the Brazilian and Venezuelan dominated system22.  This may help to explain why 
Chile has demonstrated a more active foreign policy, particularly in free trade. 
Connecting the Internal and External 
 
 When two variables are introduced as causal factors it is important to understand 
how they interact with one another.  Does one possess greater explanatory power than 
the other?  On their face it would be easy to make the assumption that internal stability 
is a necessary condition for external ambiguity to come into play.  After all a state unable 
to effectively govern within their own borders isn’t going to be able to pursue an active 
foreign policy.  But I would argue that if the possible external changes are great enough 
even the weakest leaders will attempt an active foreign policy.  Mitigating a threat or 
achieving a prominent foreign policy success might actually create greater domestic 
stability.   
                                                        
21 Eddie Walsh, “Latin America’s Pacific Gateway,” The Diplomat, November 30, 2011, 
http://thediplomat.com/2011/11/latin-americas-pacific-gateway/. 
22 Moises Naim, “The Most Important Alliance You’ve Never Heard Of,” The Atlantic Monthly, February 
17, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/the-most-important-alliance-
youve-never-heard-of/283877/. 
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 Certainly some states are going to be more responsive to either a state level or 
systemic variable.  I argue that a democracy is more likely to be effected by external 
ambiguity while an authoritarian regime is going to care more about domestic stability.  
In a democracy the stakes are not as high to keep power, a party could always come back 
into power in the next round of elections.  Authoritarian regimes on the other hand rely 
on keeping power for their wealth and safety; few dictators once deposed ever return to 
office.  At the same time an authoritarian regime with a high level of internal stability 
has a lot more room to take risks in an only somewhat favorable external environment 
than a democratically elected leader who is confident in their position.  The democrat 
must confront bureaucratic constraints and her temporal limitations, while the 
authoritarian leader has few if any inherent restrictions on her ability to develop a 
maneuvering foreign policy. 
Hypotheses 
 
 Considering the theory proposed this paper will investigate three different 
hypotheses both quantitatively and qualitatively.   
 H1: A greater degree of trade diversification will lead a small state to 
pursue a high level of foreign policy initiative.  
 
 Although this relationship is not directly related to the theory discussed it will be 
tested because of its pervasiveness in previous small state foreign policy literature23. 
These arguments revolve around a small state’s dependence on a larger power.  Trade 
dependence can be seen as an economic measure of this condition.  This is particularly 
relevant for states whose economy has been traditionally driven by a single commodity, 
                                                        
23 For examples see Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, “Opportunities and Limitations of the Exercise of 
Foreign Policy Power by a Very Small State: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago,” Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 23, no. 3 (September 2010): 421; Mehdiyeva, Power Game in the Caucasus, 52–5. 
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fossil fuels being the most pronounced and prevalent example.  The belief is that as they 
continue their mediocre economic rise, the diversification of their sectoral or state-to-
state trade relationships will allow these small states to break away from the traditional 
patron-client relationship24.  This relationship can be broken and reestablished based 
upon fluctuating economic and political circumstances.  The state’s ability to devote 
energy to the management of foreign affairs is crucial in order to demonstrate a 
willingness to take on a larger role, regardless of the inherent risks in such a policy.  In 
poliheurisitc terms a relationship becomes patron-client once the possibility of 
damaging the connection becomes too great of a loss for the small state leaders to allow 
as a conceivable option25.  States need to be much less dependent on a larger power in 
order to attempt to function as an active small power.   
H2: A more stable domestic political condition will lead to a higher level of 
foreign policy initiative.  In other words, a regime who feels threatened by 
domestic challenges to their survival is less likely pursue international 
engagement. 
 
This is the hypothesis for the internal stability discussed previously.  The idea 
that a stable domestic atmosphere is directly related to small state foreign policy 
activity is a common thread.  For Gvalia et al. the elite consensus around Georgia’s 
Western orientation allows it to actively pursue its goals.  Panama successfully 
negotiated with the United States over the transfer of the Panama Canal in 1977 
while negotiations for the Multinational Antidrug Center agreement with the US in 
1999 failed.  Sanchez argues this is because while Panama had a strong military 
government during the earlier agreement, the relatively democratic environment 
                                                        
24 Christos Kassimeris, “The Foreign Policy of Small Powers,” International Politics 46, no. 1 (January 
2009): 94, doi:10.1057/ip.2008.34. 
25 Alex Mintz, “How Do Leaders Make Decisions?: A Poliheurisitc Perspective,” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 48, no. 1 (February 2004): 3–13. 
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during the 90’s led to weak governing and ineffective Panamanian negotiations26.  
McGlinchey argues that the weak and aging autocrats of Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan are unable to pursue multi-directional foreign policy because of the 
paranoia in their leadership position.  On the other hand neighboring Kyrgyzstan 
had a more dynamic external policy because the comparatively more democratic 
President of Kyrgyzstan is comfortable in his domestic position knowing his level 
of support through a recent election victory.  A “domestic mandate…..frees the 
Kyrgyz president’s hand in the conduct of international relations”27.  An 
authoritarian/democratic dichotomy does not lead to a thorough explanation of 
internal stability. 
A lack of governing capacity is also indicative of a dearth in internal stability.  
Countries which have not completed the state-making process are primarily 
concerned with ensuring the survival of their regimes.  The security threat does not 
come from an external source but from competing domestic foci of authority28.  
Fragile states must contend with their own internal threats before they have the 
ability to dedicate the necessary political effort to pursuing an active foreign policy.  
The strength of the international system in upholding the norm of territorial 
sovereignty actually creates an external security for these internally weak states29.  
This makes foreign policy even less of a priority for these governments. Fragile 
                                                        
26 Peter M. Sanchez, “Panama: A ‘Hegemonized’ Foreign Policy,” in Small States in World Politics: 
Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey (Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner, 2003), 68. 
27 Eric McGlinchey, “Foreign Policy and Aging Central Asian Autocrats,” Demokratizatsiya 20, no. 3 
(2012): 266. 
28 Mohammed Ayoob, “The Security Predicament of the Third World State,” in The Insecurity Dilemma: 
National Security of Thrid World States, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner, 1992), 66. 
29 Robert H. Jackson, “The Security Dilemma in Africa,” in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of 
Thrid World States, ed. Brian L. Job (Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner, 1992), 81–94. 
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states have neither the resources nor motivation to pursue a high level of foreign 
policy initiative.   
 
H3: Small states are more likely to engage in a high level of foreign policy 
initiative if decision makers perceive their state’s external environment is 
not fixed.  The perception of meaningful threats or possible gains to their 
security and prosperity will lead to a more active foreign policy. 
 
Here is the proposed external ambiguity hypothesis.  The perceived position 
of a state relative to their external environment is often said to determine a small 
state’s foreign policy.  Many have argued that small states in particular are effected 
by outside influences, as Handel claimed “Domestic determinants of foreign policy 
are less salient in weak states”30.  Small states have been shown to be active if they 
feel a benefit from altering their status quo position.  Browning shows that 
Finland’s foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War was passive due to of the 
Finnish perception that the status quo meant security contra the USSR31.  The 
Soviets were not seen as an immediate threat, but activism was viewed as 
antagonism towards their more powerful neighbor.  The second half of the Cold 
War saw an increase in the level of Finnish external involvement.  By the 1960’s 
the Soviet Union no longer appeared as great of a threat to their survival.  “Instead 
of limiting its scope for action, increasingly Finland’s geopolitical position was 
reconceptualized as a resource, in particular to enable the country to play the role 
of an arbiter and bride-builder between East and West”32.  This demonstrates that 
                                                        
30 Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), 3. 
31 Browning, “Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small States Literature,” 676. 
32 Ibid., 677. 
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a small state’s shifting belief in the benefits of the systemic status quo can 
transform its level of foreign policy initiative.   
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Quantitative Test of Small State Foreign Policy 
 
 This paper will investigate small state foreign policy through two avenues, a 
quantitative regression analysis and a qualitative case studies component.  It is a mixed 
analysis.  Both of these methods will provide different manners of insight to help create 
a more substantive and robust argument.  In both cases research will be done through 
the use of available academic resources and data.  As was demonstrated in the literature 
review there is not a consensus classification for small states versus those that are 
not.  It does not appear that a subjective definition measured in terms of a state's 
capabilities or self-image would be a fruitful distinction as these factors may be 
endogenous variables to the pattern which this paper is investigating.  Instead a small 
state will be classified as those with a population between 250,000 and 20 million 
people as well as a total, nominal GDP below $500 billion.  These qualifiers take into 
account the relevance of both population and economic clout in determining state size, 
while the lower population limit will exclude what are traditionally termed micro-
states.  These are often small island nations whose state‘ness’ is in dispute and which 
may distort any findings.  This leaves a count of 112 states which fit this definition of 
small. 
Methodology 
 
Because of the generalized nature of the theories proposed a quantitative analysis 
is conducive to this thesis.  A regression analysis is an excellent tool to establish a strong 
correlation between two or more variables.  In trying to explain a wide-spread pattern it 
is important to test a broad, international set of data.  However, conceptualizing my 
variables into quantifiable and testable values is a complicated endeavor.  In general the 
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field of foreign policy analysis has been slow to adopt a positivist, quantitative approach 
to the degree that the rest of the international relations field has, instead it has 
traditionally relied more on narrative sources1.  This lack of related models of testing 
makes these possible tests more difficult as the basis for the selection of variables, causal 
relationship and testing methods are not solidified in the academic field. 
Because of the lack of quantitative testing in foreign policy analysis there is a 
dearth of relevant databases from which to utilize.  The most difficult variable to 
conceptualize for this purpose is my dependent variable, an attempted active foreign 
policy.  The best hope to quantify this concept would be derived from foreign policy 
event data similar to the dataset utilized by East2.  These event datasets are problematic 
for a number of reasons, but the greatest issue is that they have not been continued past 
the Cold War and creating one is a difficult and time-consuming process3.  However, the 
new Global Database on Events, Language, and Tone or GDELT is a relevant source to 
capture the concepts discussed in quantities.   
GDELT Event Count 
 
GDELT is a database of human societal-scale behavior and beliefs across all 
countries of the world through the collection and detailed coding of millions of events 
from 1979 to the present4.  GDELT is a massive dataset that was released very recently 
and appears to have yet to be employed in pertinent academic literature.  GDELT is a 
source of meta-data derived from a large collection of news sources and machine coded 
                                                        
1 Philip A. Schrodt, Event Date in Foreign Policy Analysis (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, October 
1993), 2, http://eventdata.psu.edu/papers.dir/Haney.pdf. 
2 East, “Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models.” 
3 Schrodt, Event Date in Foreign Policy Analysis, 5. 
4 Kalev Leetaru and Philip A. Schrodt, GDELT: Global Data on Events, Language, and Tone, 1979-2012 
(San Diego, CA: International Studies Association Annual Conference, April 2013), 
http://gdelt.utdallas.edu/data/documentation/ISA.2013.GDELT.pdf. 
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according to the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations coding scheme.  Because of 
its exhaustive nature, GDELT is able to code a massive number of events both in terms 
of variety and sheer quantity.  For 2008 GDELT coded over 6 million events.  A 
database this size can be very difficult to manage.  To try to obtain a useful count of 
events for each state there had to be a process of aggregation. 
Using the 2008 reduced file I first selected only events which fell under the broad 
CAMEO categories of “Consult,” “Engage in Diplomatic Cooperation,” “Engage in 
Material Cooperation” and “Provide Aid.”  This aggregation eliminates actions which 
may only deal with appeals or expressions of intent or are indications of a lack of foreign 
policy initiative like a reduction in relations.  To obtain a count of events by a state the 
actor1 variable had to be that state’s three-letter CAMEO code either on its own or with 
an additional specification for government, military, or media.  In order to not measure 
domestic events the actor2 code could not contain the same three-letter country code 
and could not be solely a three-letter societal role code without the designation of a 
foreign country5.  This aggregation process did not eliminate all domestic events for a 
variety of reasons, but it did mitigate their influence enough to warrant a belief that the 
counts were not significantly influenced by internal circumstances.  Unfortunately, the 
codes for Bosnia & Herzegovina, Slovenia and Montenegro were unable to be located 
within the dataset and so the three were dropped from the test. 
While the GDELT event count does give a new measure of foreign policy initiative 
there are discrepancies in the data which puts its validity into question.  The first is that 
regions are over or under reported because of both their inherent instability as well as 
                                                        
5 The codes taken out of the count were: CVL, EDU, COP, AGR, BUS, HLH, CRM, DEV, ENV, ELI, LAB, HRI, REB, INS, 
OPP, MED, UAF, PTY, MIL, GOV, LEG, REF, JEW, CHR, MOS, BUD, ZRO, CON, HIN, SPY, GYP, JUST, REL, SEP. 
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possible news services biases6.  On the two extremes the MENA region has an average 
count of 4028.8, while the Sub-Saharan African region average is only 749.9.  Certainly 
this sort of regional variation may in fact be simply an indication of more active states in 
the Middle East, but a one-way ANOVA test of the event count across the five regions 
gives an F value of 11.46.  However, a Bonferroni test shows that only the differences in 
means between MENA and the other four regions are statistically significant at a .05 
level.  The Middle East regional system may just be an exception. 
However, that difference may derive from the fact that the Middle East has a 
large proportion of over reported states versus the rest of the world.  In looking over the 
data it becomes apparent that some states are likely over reported because of their 
political situation.  This can be seen in the high numbers for states like Cuba and 
Zimbabwe.  They both have the highest count for their respective regions, and although 
they may be the most active small states in their region it could be argued that their 
historical and political circumstances means that media is likely to focus on their 
activity to a higher degree than states such as Botswana or Trinidad & Tobago.  This 
problem is particularly evident in looking at Israel.  The Israeli count is double that of 
any other state, this outlier skews the dataset and creates an unrealistic measurement of 
foreign policy initiative.  Undoubtedly Israel is a small state with a very high level of 
foreign policy initiative, but to say that it is twice as active as any other small state would 
be unrealistic.  Once again Israel’s historic and political circumstance leads to it’s over 
coverage in reporting. 
                                                        
6 Joshua Keating, “What Can We Learn from the Last 200 Million Things That Happened in the World?,” 
Foreign Policy, April 10, 2013, 
http://ideas.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/10/what_can_we_learn_from_the_last_200_million_th
ings_that_happened_in_the_world. 
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Creation of a Foreign Policy Initiative Variable  
 
 Considering that the GDELT event count possesses some inherent problems as a 
measurement of foreign policy initiative there is a need to create a better gauge.  This 
paper does so by first turning it into only half of what constitutes as the foreign policy 
initiative variable.  The other half of the variable is determined by the number of free 
trade agreements and highly-structured IGOs (HSIGOs) the state is a part of.  FTA data 
is taken from The Design of International Trade Agreements Dataset (DESTA)7.  This 
count is indicative of the degree to which a state is active in the global economy.  The 
HSIGO count derives from the number of IGOs designated as highly-structured by 
Karreth & Tir that a state takes part in.  These IGOs possess “tools for enforcing 
organizational decisions and norms; they are capable of coercing state compliance with 
IGO policies”8.  Membership into these organizations are a sign of a state’s institutional 
foreign policy initiative.  The highly structured nature of these IGOs signifies that 
membership means a state is more fully a part of the international regime, while low-
structured IGOs are more likely to be weak organizations in which membership is not an 
indication of prolonged interaction with other states.  Between these three counts there 
are measurements for different iterations of foreign policy initiative; diplomatic activity, 
economic interaction and institutional embeddedness. 
 An additive index will be utilized to combine these variables.  Because of the 
disparate nature of the counts, a standardization is applied to each before joining them.  
For the FTA and HSIGOs counts this standardization transformed into a recognizable 
                                                        
7 L Dur, L Baccini, and M Elsig, “The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducting a New 
Dataset,” The Review of International Organizations, 2014, http://www.designoftradeagreements.org/. 
8 Johannes Karreth and Jaroslav Tir, “International Institutions and Civil War Prevention,” Journal of 
Politics 75, no. 1 (2013): 98. 
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normal distribution.  Because of the variance of the GDELT count a simple 
standardization into z-scores did not produce a normal distribution, but a skewness of 
4.09 and Israel persisting as an outlier with a z-score of 7.3.  This would have put an 
undue amount of statistical influence on those states, like Israel, which have a 
particularly high event count.  To mitigate this problem the GDELT count was first 
logged and then standardized.  This produced a much more robust variable for the 
additive index of normalized counts.  To make the event count weighted as half the DV 
its logged standardization was doubled before adding.  In formulaic terms the final 
dependent variable is constructed as 
Foreign Policy Initiative = std(ln(# of Events)*2 + std(# of FTAs) + std(# of HSIGOs). 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 A multivariate regression analysis model is utilized in order to test the validity of 
hypotheses on the foreign policy initiative dependent variable.  I first control for a 
number of factors drawn from the previous literature review on small state foreign 
policy. As has been pointed out in previous literature the wealth of a small state is an 
important variable in explaining an active foreign policy9.  This paper does not dispute 
that relationship, but sees wealth as a mediating variable and will examine it as such in 
its relationship with the proposed hypotheses.  Democracy is also controlled for through 
the Economist Intelligence Unit 2008 Democracy Index10.  Finally, regional controls are 
utilized.  This is due to both the over reporting problems discussed above, as well as the 
fact that regional systems do have an impact on a state’s foreign policy.  Table 1 shows 
                                                        
9 Braveboy-Wagner, “Opportunities and Limitations of the Exercise of Foreign Policy Power by a Very 
Small State: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago,” September 2010; Cooper and Momani, “Qatar and 
Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy.”; Hey, “Luxembourg’s Foreign Policy: Does Small Size 
Help or Hinder?”. 
10 Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008). 
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an ANOVA test for our foreign policy initiative variable across regions.  It demonstrates 
that there is a significant difference in the mean across the five regions. 
Table 1 ANOVA Across Foreign Policy Initiative 
Region Mean Std. Deviation N 
Americas -0.4225 2.215 21 
Europe 3.114 2.624 26 
Asia/Oceania -1.022 2.638 19 
Africa -2.304 2.018 33 
MENA 2.336 2.323 10 
Total 0 3.162 109 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-ratio P Value 
Between Groups 505.31 4 126.33 22.87 0.0000 
Within Group 574.49 104 5.52  
Total 1079.8 108 10  
N 
Adj R2 
109 
.448 
 
 H1 is tested using a trade dependence variable derived from the IMF Direction of 
Trade Yearbook11.  The percentage of a state’s imports and exports with its largest 
trading partner in 2008 is multiplied by the percentage of their GDP which derives from 
trade in goods and services.  This variable measures how much of the small state’s 
economy is tied to trade with another state, an indication of dependence.  There are 
other measures of dependence beyond economic connectivity such as arms transfer 
reliance which take into account military dependence.  For the purposes of the type of 
dependence described above this trade dependence variable is a valid measure.  If H1 is a 
factor in accounting for variation in the dependent variable then we should see a 
negative correlation between trade dependence and foreign policy initiative. 
   
In order to test H2 I need to create a measure of internal stability.  To quantify this 
stability I add together two different indicators of the 2008 Fund for Peace Failed States 
                                                        
11 Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2010). 
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Index12.  The indicators for both State Legitimacy and Factionalized Elites are on a 0 to 
10 scale.  These two indicators do well to capture the idea of domestic stability.  State 
Legitimacy does take into account level of democracy but also includes measures of 
government effectiveness, corruption and civil discontent.  Factionalized Elites is meant 
to measure struggles for power, elite discontent and political competition.  These scales 
gauge the two sources of domestic insecurity, lack of governance capacity as well as a 
highly contentious and adversarial political environment.  They also measure instability 
from both the general public and from the elite.  A positive relationship between foreign 
policy initiative and domestic confidence will support H2. 
The indication of a state’s external ambiguity is measured jointly by its military 
spending as a percentage of its GDP from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute as well as the Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset from the Center for 
Systemic Peace13.  The former is the sum of each state’s region rated magnitude of 
interstate and civil violence score for the years 2004-2008 (divided by the number of 
states in the region).  Because of the ambiguous nature of the designated regions, events 
in bordering states are given double magnitude while events involving the state in 
question are given triple magnitude.  This helps to take into account a state’s more 
pressing concerns about its security and stability.  For instance, although both the 
Gambia and Central African Republic are designated as West Africa, the CAR has a 
higher magnitude score because of its domestic conflicts as well as instability in 
neighbors like Chad and Democratic Republic of Congo during the 5-year period. 
                                                        
12 The Failed States Index 2008 (Washington DC: The Fund for Peace, 2008), 
http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2008-sortable. 
13 “Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2012,” n.d., 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. 
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A state which exists in a volatile regional system is likely to feel that they’re 
position is changeable, while a high degree of military spending is indicative of a state 
which is expressing this insecurity through an emphasis on military capabilities. In this 
way an uncertain state is likely to pursue both a high degree of foreign policy initiative 
as well as large military expenditures.  If H3 is supported then our test should produce a 
positive correlation between both these independent variables and foreign policy 
initiative.  
 While these two measures of external ambiguity are able to capture insecurity, 
they are not a yardstick for perceived opportunity.  This is an extremely difficult concept 
to quantifiably distinguish because of its adaptable and subjective nature.  However, 
membership in the European Union creates a higher level of perceived opportunities.  The EU 
provides small member-states with a unique set of external circumstances because it 
“governs itself in new ways that moderate the traditional realist calculus of big-small 
state relation”14.  Small states have the ability to disproportionately benefit from the 
strong institutions of the EU, while also facing the potential costs of decreased 
autonomy15.   
Small EU member-states are in a position to take advantage of both the formal 
structures and informal aspects of integration.  Formally, EU institutions make 
traditional power capabilities less important and codify acceptable member-state 
behavior, thereby protecting small state influence16.  While in both the European 
                                                        
14 Alyson J.K. Bailes and Baldur Thorhallsson, “Instrumentalizing the European Union in Small State 
Strategies,” Journal of European Integration 35, no. 2 (2013): 101. 
15 Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, “Introduction,” in Small States in Europe, ed. Robert Steinmetz 
and Anders Wivel (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 9. 
16 Anders Wivel, “From Small State to Smart State: Devising a Strategy for Influence in the European 
Union,” in Small States in Europe, ed. Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel (Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2010), 23. 
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Parliament representation and in the Council’s qualified majority voting small states 
have proportionately more say than their population should warrant.  Informally, the 
consensus culture of EU decision-making ensures that a small member’s voice will be 
heard.  At the same time the European Commission’s supranational interest means that 
small states can develop close ties to it on specific policy areas regardless of which post 
their national Commissioner holds17.  Overall the convoluted mix of supranational and 
intergovernmental policy-making in the EU provides small states with openings to 
change their external position in order to further their interests and increase their 
influence beyond what would be conceivable otherwise.  A positive correlation between 
EU membership and foreign policy initiative supports H3. 
Results 
 
 Table 2 presents the results of our regression analysis.  Initial evidence in support 
of H2 and H3 can be seen in Model 1 where the coefficients for both are positive and 
significant, except for regional insecurity.  Greater domestic confidence, military 
spending and EU membership correlates to a country more likely to pursue an active 
external policy.  Model 1 also demonstrates a lack of support for H1 with a positive, 
insignificant coefficient.  This lack of correlation is present across all three models.  
Therefore I am unable to reject the null hypothesis of H1; it appears that economic 
dependence does not meaningfully alter a state’s foreign policy initiative.  Model 2 tells a 
somewhat different story.  The addition of control variables takes away the significance 
of domestic confidence.  In its place it appears that wealth has a positive significant 
                                                        
17 Baldur Thorhallsson, “The Role of Small States in the European Union,” in Small States in 
International Relations, ed. Christine Ingebritsen et al. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 
3–36. 
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correlation in this second test.  Both of the control variables behave as predicted, yet the 
adjusted R2 value does not increase substantially from model 1 indicating that these 
variables do not explain that much more of the variation in foreign policy initiative.   
Table 2 Multivariate Regression of Foreign Policy Initiative 
Variables Model 1 
 
Model 2 
(Controls) 
Model 3 
(Regional Controls)+ 
GDP/Capita   0.00004* 
(0.00001) 
0.00002 
(0.00001) 
 
Democracy  0.314 
(0.188) 
0.043 
(0.187) 
 
Trade Dependence 
(H1) 
1.203 
(2.085) 
1.259 
(2.009) 
0.032 
(1.83) 
 
Domestic Confidence 
(H2) 
0.302* 
(0.068) 
0.111 
(0.0926) 
0.178* 
(0.08) 
 
Regional Insecurity 
(H3) 
0.131 
(0.117) 
0.168 
(0.118) 
0.241* 
(0.107) 
 
Military Expenditures 
as % of GDP (H3) 
0.583* 
(0.161) 
0.56* 
(0.155) 
0.41* 
(0.148) 
 
European Union++ 
(H3) 
2.7* 
(0.752) 
2.032* 
(0.744) 
 
 
 
MENA   0.494 
(1.056) 
 
Europe   2.062* 
(0.695) 
 
Asia/Oceania   -0.629 
(0.796) 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa   -2.497* 
(0.739) 
 
Constant 1.7 -2.831 0.617 
 
N 
Adj R2 
90 
.448 
88 
.498 
88 
.619 
*Statistically Significant at p<0.05 
+=Americas is omitted region from test. 
++=EU member-state coded a “1” 
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Despite the lack of significance both domestic confidence and regional insecurity do still 
remain positive. 
 Model 3 controls across geographic world regions regardless of organizational 
membership, dropping the EU variable because of its congruity with the Europe 
region18.  A regional control model produces further evidence in support of both H2 and 
H3.  Once again domestic confidence and military spending have positive and significant 
coefficients, while the positive relationship to wealth is no longer significant.  It appears 
that that correlation can be explained through the significant coefficients of Europe and 
Africa, which are positive and negative respectively.  By controlling for regions the 
regional insecurity variable now becomes significant indicating that within regions 
proximity to unrest increases foreign policy initiative, this supports H3.  Model 3 
explains more variation in foreign policy initiative than the other models with an 
adjusted R2 value of .619.  By controlling for regional disparities it appears that the 
correlation between wealth and small state foreign policy initiative cannot explain 
variation to the extent that internal and external political dynamics are able to.   
 Because of the strength of regional controls in the model it is reasonable to 
assume that regional systems do have a significant impact on small state’s activeness 
abroad.  This begs the question of whether the evidence in support of the European 
Union leading to higher foreign policy initiative in Models 1 and 2 is a legitimate 
connection or whether it is just indicative of a European region which is conducive to 
active small states.  To explore this further I run an ANOVA test for foreign policy 
initiative for all small states in the Europe region.  I test for variance across three levels 
                                                        
18 A regional controls test including the EU variable produces a positive, insignificant correlation for it 
while not increasing the adjusted R2 value. 
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of integration.  Non-EU membership, EU membership outside of the Eurozone, and EU 
membership with monetary union19.  The distinction between the latter two forms of 
membership is important because small states economies are particularly vulnerable to 
international pressures20.  Membership into the euro area should increase a small state’s 
perception of external ambiguity beyond non-monetary membership.  This is due to the 
fact that institutions like the European Central Bank help to diminish the control of 
large states in monetary policy.  At the same time a small state’s adoption of the Euro 
increases the benefit from engaging in the international economy but also presents 
exogenous risks including real exchange-rate appreciation if they are unable to compete 
with Germany’s productivity and export growth21.  By using the Euro small states have 
more reason to pursue an active foreign policy.  If external ambiguity does increase 
foreign policy initiative then we should find an increase in activeness alongside deeper 
integration. 
Table 3 ANOVA Across Foreign Policy Initiative For European Region 
EU Integration Mean Std. Deviation N 
Non-Member 1.773 1.594 8 
Non-Eurozone 2.251 2.415 11 
Eurozone 6.001 1.585 7 
Total 3.114 2.624 26 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F-ratio P Value 
Between Groups 80.95 2 40.47 10.21 0.0007 
Within Group 91.22 23 3.97  
Total 172.16 25 6.89  
N 
Adj R2 
26 
.424 
 
                                                        
19 States which adopted the Euro during the 2008 period were counted as non-Eurozone 
20 Peter J Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Cornell Studies in 
Pol. Economy (Cornell Univ Pr, 1985), http://search.proquest.com/docview/59371159?accountid=14503. 
21 Rainer Kattel, Tarmo Kalvet, and Tiina Randma-Liiv, “Small States and Innovation,” in Small States in 
Europe, ed. Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 78. 
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 The results shown in Table 3 provide initial support for the effect of European 
integration on small state foreign policy.  The mean increases along with deeper 
integration and the p-value is well below the .05 threshold, while the adjusted R2 value is 
.424.  It should be acknowledged that this test does not control for other factors whose 
correlation to foreign policy initiative have been established.  However, similar tests 
across these classifications for both wealth and domestic confidence result in an 
insignificant p-value.   
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Lilliputian Choice in Action 
 
The Selection of Case Studies 
 
 An extensive exploration of the political, economic and cultural factors which 
shape the foreign policies in a limited set of small states will allow for a greater 
understanding of a generalized theory put into real-world context.  A qualitative 
approach is an effective compliment to quantitative testing to create a stronger causal 
connection.  Case studies are the dominant approach to foreign policy analysis and are 
heavily utilized in small state literature in particular.  For these reasons they will be used 
for the purpose of furthering the arguments made in this paper. 
Choosing which small states to delve into is a crucial step in the research process.  
The cases need to be able to illustrate discernable differences in foreign policy initiative 
while at the same time highlighting key differences and similarities in internal stability 
and external ambiguity.  This section of the paper will lay out the recent policies in 
international affairs for each case followed by an examination of the political processes 
and state characteristics which may add insight into their development of foreign policy 
preferences and decision-making.  By contrasting these two external behaviors I will 
illustrate what small state activity can look like in the changed international system 
previously described.  While Qatar has taken advantage of the new avenues at their 
disposal to maneuver and influence, Kuwait has pursued a foreign policy lacking 
distinctive small state strategies.  Following these illustrative contemporary examples of 
small state foreign policy variation, the domestic stability and external ambiguity of 
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each state will be explored.  This paper will utilize a dyadic comparisons based upon an 
attempt to develop a most-similar case study. 
 Both Qatar and Kuwait are energy-rich Arab monarchies which share a similar 
history, culture and geography.  Both would be considered small by nearly any definition 
with populations under four million (of which citizens make up only a fraction)1, and are 
surrounded by larger powers and a US military presence.  Qatar and Kuwait have two of 
the wealthiest populations in the world, with a 2011 GDP per capita, PPP of $82,348 and 
$45,455 respectively2.  In both instances these Gulf sheikhdoms have experienced a 
large influx of petrodollars which have led to immense economic growth and little 
domestic dissent from their authoritarian rule.  Yet, they have exhibited noticeable 
differences in the extent to which they have played in active role internationally to try to 
influence events in other countries independently of any larger power.  
Wealthy Arab Monarchies 
 
Qatari Foreign Policy: Exemplar of Small Power 
 
 For over a decade Qatar has arguably demonstrated the highest level of foreign 
policy initiative among small states.  Since Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani took 
control of the country from his father through a bloodless coup in 1995 Qatar has made 
an effort to build itself into a regional power3.  This has resulted in the emirate being 
involved with so many conflicts over that time period that it has become expected that 
                                                        
1 Lin Noueihed, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a 
New Era (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 249. 
2 World Bank, “Data | The World Bank,” accessed December 5, 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/. 
3 Elisheva Rosman-Stollman, “Qatar: Liberalization as Foreign Policy,” in Political Liberalization in the 
Persian Gulf, ed. Joshua Teitelbaum (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 204. 
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no matter the crisis Qatar will find a role to play4.  Qatari foreign policy initiative is seen 
through its mediation, assistance (both humanitarian and military), diplomatic 
ambition and cultural influence. 
 The first sign of Qatari ambitions was the launch of the satellite news channel Al-
Jazeera in 1996.  Although privately owned, the royal family (and by extension the state) 
finances the large media operation which is seen across the Arabic speaking world5.  
Since its launch the network has been an active voice in shaping Arab public opinion 
and framing issues in a manner analogous to Qatari foreign policy.  During the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 Al-Jazeera was criticized by American officials for its harsh 
coverage.  The Arab Spring uprisings provided an amazing opportunity for Al-Jazeera to 
influence events outside of Qatar.  Its non-stop positive coverage of the uprisings in 
Tunisia and Egypt as well as the rebels in Libya and Syria galvanized support for their 
causes and has been called “Al Jazeera’s moment”6.  Through its indirect influence on 
the network Qatar has attempted to alter regional, and now global7, public opinion to 
further Qatari interests.   
 Qatar has utilized its small size to act as a “neutral” mediator in a variety of 
conflicts.  Qatar was the only Arab state to take on the Lebanese crisis following the 
2006 fighting between Israel and Hezbollah as the Doha Agreement of 2008 created a 
new national unity government in Beirut.  Qatar has also pushed for peace talks between 
                                                        
4 Lina Khatib, “Qatar’s Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism,” International Affairs 89, no. 2 (2013): 
417, doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12025. 
5 Cooper and Momani, “Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy.,” 122. 
6 Robert Kirkpatrick, “Seizing a Moment, Al Jazeera Galvanizes Arab Frustration,” The New York Times, 
January 28, 2011, Section A; Column 0; Foreign Desk; Pg. 1. 
7 Al-Jazeera English was launched in 2006, while Al-Jazeera America began broadcasting in 2013.  The 
degree of Qatari editorial control of these non-Arabic networks is much weaker, but it is still unknown 
how truly independent they will be. 
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Israel and Hamas and hosted the political offices for the Taliban during failed talks with 
the Afghan government in 20138.  Through mediation Qatar has attempted to expand its 
influence as a regional player9, and has been able to initiate such a foreign policy 
behavior because of its small size and increased relevance of its economic and social 
prominence. 
 Qatar has attempted to achieve its goals by utilizing its vast wealth to support 
those governments and groups which it feels align with their interest.  Qatar was the 
loudest Arab backer of the Libyan rebels and the NATO-led mission against the Gaddafi 
regime.  Early on in the conflict it provided rebels with military, financial and logistical 
support which included sending in hundreds of Qatari Special Forces to train fighters10.  
It even committed military resources in support of the UNSC resolution in the form of 
F-16 fighter jets, a move which went beyond anything done by other members of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)11.  In the Syrian Civil War Qatar has been a major 
backer of the anti-Assad forces by arming rebel groups it sees as supporting their 
interest as well as brokering the creation of the umbrella Syrian National Council in 
Doha12.  In Egypt, Qatar was the only Gulf state to support the Muslim Brotherhood 
government providing them with strong financial and diplomatic support including 
large aid packages and favorable Al-Jazeera coverage13.   
                                                        
8 Rob Nordland and Alissa J. Rubin, “Mixed Signals as Taliban Try Another Tactic,” The New York Times, 
June 26, 2013. 
9 Khatib, “Qatar’s Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism,” 419. 
10 Noueihed, The Battle for the Arab Spring, 182–5. 
11 Steven Wright, “Qatar,” in Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies, ed. Christopher M 
Davidson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 131. 
12 Khatib, “Qatar’s Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism,” 422. 
13 Robert F. Worth, “Egypt Is Arena for Influence of Arab Rivals,” The New York Times, July 10, 2013. 
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 Qatar has demonstrated strategic maneuvering in their relations with larger 
powers.  With its size, wealth and religious status Saudi Arabia should be the regional 
hegemon of the Sunni Arab world.  Yet Saudi-Qatari relations have often times been 
tense as the upstart peninsular nation is seen as a thorn in the side of Saudi dominance.  
While both monarchies have taken similar stances to issues like the opposition to the 
Shiite-led Bahraini protests, support for Syrian rebels and possible GCC expansion they 
have more often than not gone head to head because of Qatar’s high level of foreign 
policy initiative.  This has even led to a feeling among Qataris of a ‘cold war’ with Saudi 
Arabia as the two states vie for control of the Arab world14.  The Qatari-US relationship 
is considered to be strong, particularly considering the security guarantee that comes 
along with housing US Central Command as Qatar does at the Al-Udeid air base.  But 
while the US may appreciate Qatar’s mediation role in promoting stability and as a 
counterweight to Saudi supremacy, its close relations and support for organizations like 
Hamas and public denunciation of US policy in the region ruffles feathers in the 
relationship.  In terms of Iran and Israel Qatar has generally taken the normal Arab 
confrontational position.  However, it has been much more willing to engage in 
opportunities to improve relations.  Such actions include opening an Israeli interest 
office in Doha and voting against Iranian sanctions while on the UNSC15. 
 Soft power is key to understanding Qatar’s foreign policy initiative.  It has utilized 
it to further its prestige and increase what Peterson termed their “branding”16.  The 
funding and establishment of Education City in Doha brings to Qatar branches of some 
                                                        
14 Allen J. Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 92. 
15 Ibid., 23; 103. 
16 J.E. Peterson, “Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State,” Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (Fall 
2006): 732–48. 
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of the top American universities including Georgetown, Carnegie Mellon, Northwestern 
and Texas A&M17.  The country has also lured many think-tanks to open up shop in 
Doha, the most prominent being the Brookings Institute and RAND Corporation.  This 
collection of Western centers of academia and research allows for Qatar to be seen as the 
leader in educational excellence in the Middle East increasing its cultural importance18.  
A recent victory for Qatar in terms of prestige is being selected to host the 2022 World 
Cup.  Qatar faces a massive challenge to ready itself for the tournament, but hosting will 
make the tiny country a household name around the world19.   
 Contrary to Peterson Kamrava argues that Qatar is too small, and that its cultural 
influence is too miniscule to claim that it possess soft power.  Instead the author says 
that Qatar’s power can be described as “subtle.”  This subtle power is contingent on four 
elements: military security, wealth, branding and active diplomacy20.  The distinction 
between soft and subtle power may seem unimportant, but it demonstrates that small 
states like Qatar can manifest their influence and power in a variety of ways. 
Kuwaiti Foreign Policy: Something Left to be desired 
 
 Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 Kuwaiti foreign policy has been both 
single-minded and safe.  These two descriptors help to understand the manner in which 
Kuwaiti foreign policy initiative has been comparatively low.  Kuwait has played a 
subdued role in regional events despite its oil wealth, instead depending on larger 
powers and quieter methods of diplomacy.  Kuwaiti foreign policy can be described by a 
                                                        
17 Ursula Lindsey, “Qatar Sets Its Own Terms for US. Universities.,” Chronicle of Higher Education 60, 
no. 12 (November 22, 2013): A23–A26. 
18 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 153. 
19 “Qatar’s World Cup Win: What Cash Can Do.,” Economist 397, no. 8712 (December 11, 2010): 58–58. 
20 Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca: Cornell Univ Press, 2013), 9. 
Scheldrup 
 
 
47 | P a g e  
 
reliance on foreign aid, the avoidance of major confrontation and a lack of independent 
action. 
 While Kuwait has demonstrated a low level of international engagement it has 
been active in terms of foreign aid.  In fact Kuwait was the largest donor of foreign aid 
outside of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in 200721.  Kuwait has used 
the foreign aid as a tool to extend its presence, but it appears that it does so as a safe and 
quiet option.  Much of this aid is also distributed through multilateral development 
groups like the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) or the Islamic 
Development Bank, thus making the gesture even less a part of direct Kuwaiti foreign 
policy interests. 
 In response to the Arab spring Kuwait took a much more passive approach to 
changing events.  Like the rest of the Gulf states Kuwait has been politically supportive 
of Syrian rebels and the uprisings with the exception of Bahrain.  However, beyond 
these actions Kuwait has stayed muted when it comes to these new regimes.  It has 
followed the political path of Saudi Arabia on most issues without committing any 
substantial political capital to the effort.  After the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, Kuwait provided half the aid to the new military government that both Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE did22.  In the new Arab media battleground Kuwait has no players 
while Al-Jazeera and the Saudi conglomerates of Al-Arabiya and the Middle East 
Broadcasting Company look to shape opinion.   
 Kuwait has looked to smooth over relations with larger powers in order to avoid 
confrontation.  Kuwait and the US have developed a strong relationship since the Iran-
                                                        
21 Kalid S. Almezaini, The UAE and Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2012), 11. 
22 Worth, “Egypt Is Arena for Influence of Arab Rivals.” 
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Iraq War.  For Kuwait the US has been a vital security partner and in 2004 was named a 
Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA).  In relations with Iran, Kuwait must contend with a 
large Shiite minority as well as geographic proximity.  Because of this Kuwait has been 
lees eager than other Arab states like Saudi Arabia to ratchet up tension with the Persian 
state23. 
Internal Stability 
 
 In comparing the political structures of Qatar and Kuwait it becomes evident that 
no two sheikhdoms are created equal.  As Almeziani notes “In the Arab Gulf states, 
foreign policy decision-making is concentrated in the hands of ruling families, 
particularly when there is one influential leader within the ruling family”24.  The Emir of 
Qatar has gone through his reign with few challenges to his leadership weighing on his 
mind.  There was an attempted counter-coup orchestrated by his father and Saudi 
Arabia in 1996 which failed25.  Since that time, in Qatar the only real constraint on the 
power of the ruler are internal Al-Thani family disputes26.  Even within the family 
Sheikh Hamad has effectively monopolized both power and control over policy by 
placing trusted cousins in key positions of power27.  The most important of these 
nepotistic policymakers is Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim, both the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister.  HBJ, as he is commonly known, is credited with several of Qatar’s 
international accomplishments28.  As the second most powerful position in Qatar, the 
                                                        
23 Kenneth Katzman, Kuwait: Security, Reform, and US Policy (Congressional Research Service, March 
29, 2013). 
24 Almezaini, The UAE and Foreign Policy, 46. 
25 Fromherz, Qatar: A Modern History, 85. 
26 Ibid., 24. 
27 Ibid., 134–5. 
28 Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, 121. 
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merger of PM with Foreign Minister is another indication of the importance that Sheikh 
Hamad has placed on external policy. 
By law Qatar is a constitutional monarchy; however the Consultative Assembly 
has no real authority and is appointed by the Emir.  The first elections to the Assembly 
were originally set for 2007, but have been pushed back on numerous occasions with 
little public discontent29.  Even with a lack of democratic values there is still an absence 
of public unrest weighing on the Qatari government.  Both at the elite and public level 
there is little indication of dissent. 
Of all the Gulf states Kuwait has far and away the most powerful legislative body.  
The National Assembly is a freely elected body with limited, but still substantial policy-
making influence.  Opposition MPs clash with the ruling family over a variety of policy 
issues, although the National Assembly can and has been dissolved by the Emir30.  The 
parliament has on occasion brought the political process to a grinding halt over 
contentious issues31.   
Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah only ascended to the throne in 2006 
through the forced abdication of the gravely ill heir apparent. Since that time the Emir 
has dealt with numerous instances of challenges to his authority.  These include 
stemming rival claims from other parts of the Sabah family as well as tense political 
standoffs with Parliament, this was manifested in 2011 when the Emir’s cabinet was 
forced to resign including his then Prime Minister nephew.  Prior to that time the 
                                                        
29 “Reforms Designed with International Reputation in Mind,” Business Monitor Online, November 7, 
2011. 
30 Anonymous, “A Desert Flower Wilts; Kuwaiti Democracy,” The Economist, October 27, 2012, 
1115552175, ProQuest Central. 
31 Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, 138. 
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position of Prime Minister was usually given to the heir apparent to the crown and was 
considered to be above reproach32.  
None of the other Gulf states come close to the level of elite cohesion seen in 
Qatar33.  Compare that to the relatively unpopular Kuwaiti Emir and his adversarial 
Parliament and it becomes evident that Qatar’s internal political stability is much higher 
than that of Kuwait.  Without fear of a domestic challenge to the regime, the Emir has a 
free hand to try to enhance Qatar’s external influence through a resilient and active 
foreign policy.  The kind of foreign policy initiative that Qatar has demonstrated could 
not be conducted unless a regime was self-assured of their domestic security. 
Recent developments in Qatar also demonstrate the power of internal stability on 
foreign policy.  In June 2013 Sheikh Hamad surprised the world by announcing that he 
would be abdicating his throne in favor of his 33-year old son, Sheikh Tamin bin Hamad 
Al-Thani.  This change in leadership has still not been totally explained.  Yet the rise of a 
new leader is indicative of a drop in internal stability.  In the few months since this 
occurrence Qatar has shown less willingness to press its influence abroad.  Domestically 
this can be seen in the fact that the new Prime Minister has a dual role as Interior 
Minister instead of HBJ’s double role as Foreign Minister34. 
External Ambiguity 
 
 Both Qatar and Kuwait exist in the same regional system, but geographic position 
alone does not determine a states feeling of external doubt.  They are both part of the US 
                                                        
32 David B. Roberts, “Kuwait,” in Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies, ed. Christopher M 
Davidson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 96–7. 
33 Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, 138. 
34 “Qatar’s New Emir Sheikh Tamin Unveils New Cabinet,” BBC News, June 26, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23071586. 
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security umbrella and both are surrounded by larger, unfriendly neighbors.  However, 
Kuwait still develops policy with the specter of invasion looming.  It was through the 
prism of Iraq that Kuwait developed foreign policy during the 1990’s and gave support 
to the US invasion in 2003.  Since then, relations with a Post-Saddam Iraq have only 
improved marginally.  Along with its proximity to Iran, Kuwait has developed a foreign 
policy preference based upon the need for external security.  They have fulfilled this 
security through US and Saudi protection.    Kuwait feels that they are in a known 
external environment in which changes in the status quo are not in their interest.  This 
does not drive an active foreign policy.  If a US security guarantee did not exist the 
feeling of insecurity would be so great that you would likely see a Kuwait with a higher 
level of foreign policy initiative.  
 Qatar initially feels much more secure then Kuwait because of its more favorable 
geographic position and no recent memory of invasion.  With the demise of the 
traditional Arab hegemon in Egypt and a more manageable Saudi Arabia Qatar sees an 
opportunity to furthers its interests and extend its prestige and brand across the Arab 
world.  Kamrava notes that Qatar is trying to shape what Arabism is today35.  These two 
case studies also provide empirical support to a positive relationship between foreign 
policy initiative and external ambiguity.  While Kuwait is handcuffed by their benefit in 
the status quo, Qatar sees opportunities to benefit from an active policy abroad.  Overall 
however the state level of analysis seem to have a greater causal relationship in this 
comparison.  This follows the democratic-authoritarian prediction made earlier 
concerning which level presents itself as more of a factor.   
                                                        
35 Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, 42. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Small states are in a precarious position as they try to navigate the complicated 
waters of international relations.  They now have an opportunity to be a larger force in 
those waters instead of being controlled by the current.  Whether or not they attempt to 
change their position is a question that is important in understanding global 
interactions and international relations in the future.  This paper presents a useful 
framework to understand the factors influencing foreign policy development in small 
states.  Internal stability and external ambiguity are two key factors in understanding 
both the why and how of a small state’s foreign policy initiative. This model of 
preference making can be applied broadly to understand the level of foreign policy 
activism in small states across regional systems.  
 This model is also supported through a quantitative regression analysis.  
Considering the lack of quantitative methods in the academic subfield of foreign policy 
analysis this thesis breaks ground in utilizing meta-data to analysis broad variation in 
diplomatic activity.  This manner of testing could provide robust and new results to a 
wide range of possible research questions.  Concerning this paper meta-data has been 
utilized deductively to develop a systematic theory concerning small state foreign policy 
supported through mixed methodology testing, another apparent first in the field.  That 
being said, I acknowledge the shortcomings of the testing done.   
In the future this theory would be further supported by a time-series regression 
analysis and a deeper insight into each state’s event count.  This paper does not address 
some important questions concerning small state foreign policy.  In particular the causal 
factors leading to specific small state external strategies as well as the determinants of 
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success for these bantam actors.  Keeping in mind the findings of this thesis it would 
also be beneficial for future research to explore in more detail small states in a specific 
regional system as well as the factors which determine the salience of internal and 
external factors on them.  This paper treats size as a generalizing feature determining 
foreign policy behavior.  Yet the states which make up my classification of small have 
vastly different political characteristics, levels of development and historical 
circumstances.  Smaller studies investigating certain types of small states would as well 
add to our understanding of how these Lilliputian players interact on the international 
stage.  
It is likely that in the future small states will continue to emerge as unexpected 
forces in certain policy areas or key events.  Small states exist in a position in which this 
sort of behavior lacks simple or intuitive explanation.  This paper has shown that the 
likelihood of a small state engaging in the active, smart foreign policy that the recent 
changes in the international system allow is based primarily upon internal stability and 
external ambiguity.  This framework has practical applications for scholars, analysts and 
policymakers to better understand global events and patterns of behavior. 
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